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Abstract
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle’s (1985) is studied, in which
market makers are not fiduciaries. They have some market power
which they utilize to set the price to their advantage, resulting in posi-
tive expected profits. This has several implications for the equilibrium,
the most important being that by setting a relatively modest “fee”, the
market maker is able to obtain a profit of the order of magnitude, and
even better than, a perfectly informed insider. Our model indicates
why speculative prices are more volatile than predicted by fundamen-
tals. Noise traders may be uninformed, or partially informed. We
analyze a situation where the market maker has private information
as well as being non-fiduciary. In our model this leads to a more ef-
ficient market where the insider trades less and the market maker’s
profit increases.
KEYWORDS: Insider trading, asymmetric information, strate-
gic trade, correlated trade, price distortion, partially informed market
maker
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper on insider trading, Albert Kyle (1985) asks several
questions: How valuable is private information to an insider? How does
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noise trading affect the volatility of prices? What determines the liquidity of
a speculative market? He provides answers to these and other questions by
modeling rigorously the trading strategy of an insider in a model of efficient
price information.
Kyle focuses on a single auction model in which a risky asset is exchanged
for a riskless asset among three kinds of traders. A single insider has access
to perfect, private observation of the ex post liquidation value of the risky
asset. Less informed noise traders trade randomly. Market makers set prices
and clear the markets after observing the quantities traded by others.
In the Kyle model the noise traders can be considered as less than fully
rational, since they expect to suffer losses equal to the insiders’ gains. The
market makers set the prices equal to the expected value of the risky asset
conditional on the order flow; they are making zero profits. The market
makers cannot distinguish the trading of the insider from the trading of the
noise traders, who in effect provide camouflage, which enables the insider to
make profits on their expense.
The market maker in the standard model has substantial market power,
yet does not exploit this to his own advantage when setting the price; the
market maker is assumed to be a fiduciary acting in the best interest of
market participants.
One may ask how realistic this assumption is. In the testimony before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein laid
out the Goldman Sachs perspective on the firm’s role in CDO deals related
to the 2008 financial crisis. From his answer it seems clear that he does not
consider a market maker as a fiduciary agent:
In our market-making function, we are a principal. We represent the
other side of what people want to do. We are not a fiduciary. We are not an
agent. Of course, we have an obligation to fully disclose what an instrument
is and to be honest in our dealings, but we are not managing sombody else’s
money.
Caveat emptor seems to be Mr. Blankfein’s message, and this was also the
basis of Goldman’s defense against the SEC suit re the Abacus transactions.
The case of Goldman Sachs is, we believe, not unique. Investment banks
and other financial intermediaries are known to accumulate large fortunes,
which should be difficult, or even impossible, if they were just disinterested
auctioneers.
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of relaxing the assump-
tion that market makers are fiduciaries. In our model, market makers are
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economic agents allowed to make a profit. Market makers generate prof-
its by adding a margin to the conditional expected value of the risky asset
when they are going short. Similarly they are subtracting a margin when
taking long positions. Formally, the margin is a random variable, which is
correlated with aggregate demand. Thus, market makers are not just adding
or subtracting a fee; the size of the fee depends on trading volume. As in
the standard model, informed traders realize what market makers are up to,
and take their behavior into account when deciding their own trades. Noise
traders just trade, but we allow them to have partial information. Despite of
this, market makers may make unbounded profits taking advantage of noise
traders, which would not make sense. To avoid this outcome a regulator is
introduced. Alternatively, the market maker may be assumed to practice
restraint in order to keep markets open.
Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis shows that for only a moderate cor-
relation with the aggregate demand, the profits of the market maker may
exceed that of the perfectly informed insider. This could serve as one ex-
planation of why so much wealth tends to end up in the hands of financial
intermediaries, a timely question that has been asked many times over after
the 2008-financial crisis.
Another implication of our model is that the market maker’s actions lead
to more volatile prices than would be the case if dealings were fair. We also
demonstrate that the volatility of prices increase with inside information.
This may throw some light on the observation made by Campbell and Schiller
(1988), that stock market prices display much more volatility than implied
by dividends alone. The more recent approach to this problem is to consider
the variations in the stochastic discount factor, see e.g., Campbell (1999).
We investigate whether the actions of market makers may be part of the
explanation.
To limit the distortion of prices, a regulatory authority (the SEC) im-
poses an upper bound on price volatility. In our model this limits the market
maker’s freedom to set prices. This implies the existence of an equilibrium in
which the insider maximizes profits and the market maker trades “fees”. We
also extend the model by allowing market makers to obtain private informa-
tion. The insider has more information about the value of the asset, but does
not know what the market maker believes. The market makers do not use
information strategically, but set prices equal to the asset’s expected value
conditional on private information and order flows; then they add the fee.
This extension has several interesting implications. First of all the market
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becomes more efficient, and the volatility of prices increases. As a secondary
effect the increased basic volatility may allow the market maker to charge
higher fees without disturbing the regulator. Informed market makers, and
in particular privately informed market makers, is a problem for insiders.
Opportunities for profit naturally decline, and if they do not know the in-
formation of the market makers, they reduce trading considerably. It follows
that market makers will have incentives to share any private information they
happen to receive with other market participants to increase trading and at
the same time make markets more efficient. Thus, for market makers infor-
mation is in general a mixed blessing. Less trading means less fee income.
On the other hand, higher efficiency and increased price volatility may allow
market makers to charge higher fees per trade.
This also throws some new light on one ’positive’ side of insider trading
(aside from the obvious negative aspects which we do not dwell on here); all
information arriving to the market generally has a positive effect on efficiency.
Our model allows us to extend the analysis in another direction. By using
the technique of Aase et. al. (2012a), we can let the noise traders be partially
informed, as mentioned. Since this is not enough to bound the profits of the
market maker, from Section 2.2 on we let the noise traders be uninformed.
Strategic market makers have been treated in the market microstructure
literature by several authors, for example in Biais et al. (1998), where market
makers are risk averse, but in their model information is symmetric, and the
objective is to compare different market structures. In contrast, our market
maker is not really strategic, is risk neutral, but exercises a certain degree
of monopoly, as explained above. A regulator is introduced to mitigate this,
or alternatively, the market maker may be assumed to practice restraint in
order to keep markets open. After all, it is the market maker’s responsibility
that the markets function.
Dutta and Madhavan (1997) study collusion among market makers, and
show that dealers who adopt noncooperative pricing strategies may set the
bid-ask spreads above competitive levels, on organized stock exchanges. This
form of implicit collusion differs from explicit collusion, where dealers coop-
erate to fix prices. In contrast, our market makers have a degree of ”local”
monopoly, where the customers may be thought of as having some level of
ties to the dealers, and trade is thought to be over-the-counter. Also, given
the order flow, there is no bid-ask spread in our model, but a unique price.
Other models of strategic trading behavior of market makers in security
markets under adverse selection include Glosten (1989), who studies proper-
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ties of a monopolistic specialist system as opposed to a competitive special-
ist system. Dennert (1993), Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) and Biais et al.
(2000) analyze price competition among market makers when informed and
uninformed traders are allowed to split their orders between markets. Bon-
darenko (2001) derives an equilibrium, in which each market maker behaves
as a monopolist facing a residual demand curve resulting from maximizing
behavior of the informed trader and the price schedules offered by the com-
petitors.
As this literature shows, consistent models exist where market makers
may make positive profits in equilibrium, even when there is competition
between them.
There is a vast literature on insider trading, and in particular the question
of who the noise traders are. It is the hope that our paper will shed some fur-
ther light on this latter question. Regarding the topic of rationality, Spiegel
and Subrahmanyam (1992) replaced Kyle’s uninformed liquidity traders with
strategic utility-maximizing agents trading for hedging purposes. Diamond
and Verrecchia (1981) suggest adding a noise term to agents’ risk exposures.
Risk-averse agents will then have an insurance motive for trading. De Marzo
and Duffie (1999) propose a model where different traders have different dis-
count rates. These papers solve the problem of finding a logically consistent
model that can be used for e.g., welfare statements, of markets with imperfect
information revelation.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990), Dow and Gorton (1994),
and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose limits to arbitrage in order to explain
that noise traders are not eliminated by informed traders. The view that
noise traders are less than rational is discussed in Shiller (1984), Schleifer
and Summers (1990) and Barberis and Thaler (2003). Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) introduce two types of liquidity traders, discretionary and non-
discretionary. Dow and Gorton (2006) present a broad review of various
aspects of noise traders, and conclude that the their identities, motivations
and ability to persist remain topics of research.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we find an equilibrium in
a one period model with a non-fiduciary market maker and partly informed
noise traders, in Section 3 we assume that also the market maker has private
information in addition to being non-fiduciary. Section 4 concludes.
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2 A single auction equilibrium
In this section we find an equilibrium in the one period model with a non-
fiduciary market maker. The structure of the model is the following: The
risky asset’s liquidation value v˜ is normally distributed with mean p0 and
variance σ2v , in short, v˜ ∼ N (p0, σ2v). We assume a discount rate of zero
between time 0 and time T . The quantity demanded by the noise traders is
z˜, where z˜ ∼ N (0, σ2z). The quantity demanded by the informed trader is x˜,
the price is denoted p˜.
Unlike Kyle (1985), we assume that the market maker does not set a fair
price, explained shortly, and he can also have private information.
Regarding the noise traders, while Kyle (1985) assumes z˜ and v˜ to be in-
dependent, we allow (z˜, v˜) to be jointly normally distributed with correlation
coefficient ρ, meaning Pearson’s product-moment correlation. The interpre-
tation is that when ρ > 0, the noise traders are more rational than in the
standard model. This may be because they have information, or because
whatever drives their demand is positively correlated with value. If ρ < 0
on the other hand, we interpret this as manipulation, i.e., the noise traders
have been manipulated by the informed trader.
Trading is structured in two steps as follows: In step one, the exogenous
values of v˜ and z˜ are realized and the informed trader chooses the quantity
x˜ he demands. In doing so, he observes v˜obs = v, but not z˜. The informed
trader’s trading strategy is given by some real, measurable function x : R→
R, i.e., x˜ = x(v˜).
In step two the market maker determines the price p˜ at which he trades
the quantity necessary to clear the market. In doing so he observes y˜ = (x˜+z˜)
but not x˜ or z˜ separately. He sets the price p˜ as follows:
(2.1) p˜ = p(y˜, k) = E{v˜ + u˜|y˜}
where the decision variable u˜ = ky˜, k is a real non-negative parameter. The
average price set by the market maker is E{p(y˜, k)} = p0, and thus correct
in expectation.
The market maker calculates the conditional expected value of the asset
given the order flow. Then he adds a fee if he is selling, and subtracts a fee
if he is buying. The fee is a positive linear function of market demand.
It would, perhaps, seem simpler with a fixed fee instead of a random one,
but this typically leads to discontinuities which would make the model hard
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to generalize to a continuous-time setting1.
The pricing rule is thus determined by a real, measurable function p :
R× R→ R so that p˜ = p(x˜+ z˜, k). The informed trader’s profit is denoted
by p˜iI , where p˜iI = (v˜ − p˜)x˜. The market makers profit is p˜iM , where p˜iM =
(p˜ − v˜)(x˜ + z˜). Since p˜iI , p˜iM and p˜ depend upon the real functions x(·)
and p(·), we may write p˜iI = p˜i(x, p) and p˜iM = p˜iM(x, p). We assume risk
neutrality.
In order to limit the distortion of prices, we assume that a regulatory
authority sets an upper bound on the price volatility SD(p˜) of the firm:
SD(p˜) ≤ B. When the volatility exceeds this boundary, the stock of the firm
is suspended.
Instead of this measure, we can base the analysis on the conditional ex-
pected price deviation E(y˜|y˜ > 0), which is equal to −E(y˜|y˜ < 0) by sym-
metry of the normal distribution. We return to this possibility in Section
2.2.
If k is not bounded, market makers may exploit noise traders with im-
punity. This is not reasonable. The regulator is introduced to limit exploita-
tion. In a repeated game setting, the incentive to keep markets open serve
the same purpose.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a pair of functions (x, p) such that the
following three conditions hold:
(1) Profit maximization (insider): For any other trading strategy x′ and
for any v
E{p˜i(x, p)|v˜ = v} ≥ E{p˜i(x′, p)|v˜ = v}.
(2) Price determination: The market price p˜ satisfying the regulatory con-
straint is given by
p˜(y, k, p) = E{v˜ + u˜|x˜+ z˜}.
(3) The market maker’s profit is bounded in that there exists a maximal
value of k, called k∗, such that SD(p˜) ≤ B.
As mentioned in Kyle (1985), his model is not purely game theoretic,
because the noise traders do not explicitly maximize any particular objective.
In our model they may act more rationally, see Aase et.al. (2012) for details
relating the noise traders. In addition the market maker obtains a positive
profit on average, and ’optimizes’ profits subject to the regulatory constraint.
1In the present formulation the aggregate demand at time t, yt, becomes a well defined
diffusion process consisting of an ’innovation’ term added to a mean reverting part, thus
making the model appropriate for a continuous-time extension.
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The profit depends on the parameter k, which is typically set equal to its
largest possible value under this constraint. The market maker’s strategy is
ad hoc and very intuitive, but not a direct result of optimization. However,
we believe it reflects what goes on in real markets. Our first result is the
following:
Theorem 2.1. In the situation described above, there exists an equilibrium
in which x and p are linear functions. Defining
(2.2) β =
1
2λ
− ρ
2
σz
σv
and λ =
βσ2v + k
∗(β2σ2v + σ
2
z) + (2k
∗β + 1)ρσvσz
β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρσvσz
where k∗ is the value of k determined by the regulatory constraint, the equi-
librium is given by
x(v˜) = β(v˜ − p0), p(x˜+ z˜) = p0 + λ(x˜+ z˜).
The parameter β is a solution to the cubic equation
(2.3) 2k∗σ2vβ
3 + (σ2v + 5ρk
∗σvσz)β2 + (ρσzσv + 2k∗ρ2σ2z + 2k
∗σ2z)β
+ ρ2σ2z +
k∗ρσ3z
σv
− σ2z = 0,
which also determines the constant λ. The expected profits are as follows:
The insider: E(p˜iI) = σ
2
vλβ
2.
The market maker: E(p˜iM) = λσ
2
z(1− 34ρ2)− 12σ2vβ − 14ρσvσz.
The noise traders: E(p˜iN) =
1
2
ρσvσz +
1
2
ρ2λσ2z − λσ2z .
Proof. By the joint normality assumption between v˜+ u˜ and y˜, the price
is a linear function of y˜, or
p(y) = p0 + λy, (y = x+ z),
for some constant λ, since E(y˜) = 0. The insider, realizing how the market
maker determines prices, computes his conditional expected profits, given his
private information, as follows
piI(v) = E{[v˜ − p(x˜+ z˜)]x|v˜ = v} = [v − p0 − λx− λρσz
σv
(v − p0)]x,
since by our assumption that (z˜, v˜) is binormal,
E{z˜|v˜ = v} = ρσz
σv
(v − p0)
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by the ’projection’ theorem. Profit maximization of this quadratic objective
requires that x solves
v − p0 − λρσz
σv
(v − p0)− 2λx = 0
or
x = (
1
2λ
− 1
2
ρ
σz
σv
)(v − p0) = β(v − p0).
In other words, x(v) is linear in v, and β is as in the first part of (2.2). We
must determine the price sensitivity parameter λ. By assumptions, v˜ + u˜ is
normally distributed with mean p0 and
var(v˜ + u˜) = (1 + kβ)2σ2v + k
2σ2z + 2kρσvσz(1 + βk).
Also
var(y˜) = β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρσvσz,
and
cov(v˜ + u˜, y˜) = cov(v˜, y˜) + k var(y˜) =
βσ2v + ρσvσz + kβ
2σ2v + kσ
2
z + 2kβρσvσz.
By the projection theorem
E{v˜ + u˜|y˜ = y} = p0 + ρv˜+u˜,y˜
√
var(v˜ + u˜)√
var(y˜)
· y,
where
ρv˜+u˜,y˜ =
cov(v˜ + u˜, y˜)√
var(v˜ + u˜)
√
var(y˜)
.
We notice that the term
√
var(v˜ + u˜) cancels. We have found that
p = p(y) = p0 +
βσ2v + kβ
2σ2v + (2kβ + 1)ρσvσz + kσ
2
z
β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρσvσz
· y.
This determines λ as a function of β as in the second part of (2.2). Since
(2.2) is a system of two equations in the two unknowns λ and β, eliminating
λ yields the cubic equation (2.3) in β.
This equation we have solved; it has at least one real root, one of which
is the solution of the problem. The solution β := β(k, ρ) is decreasing in k
for each value of ρ. The expected profits of the market maker is
E(p˜iM) = E((p˜− v˜)y˜) = λvar(y˜)− E(v˜y˜).
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Using that y˜ = x˜+ z˜ = β(v˜ − p0) + z˜, the relation between β and λ in (2.2)
as well as the correlation between v˜ and z˜, we get
E(p˜iM) = λσ
2
z(1−
3
4
ρ2)− 1
2
σ2vβ −
1
4
ρσvσz.
Since β(k) decreases with k, by (2.2) λ(k) must then increase with k. Hence
the market maker’s profit increases with k. Some algebra shows that the
standard deviation of the price p˜, SD(p)(k), also increases with k. Thus, the
regulatory constraint limits the value of k to some maximum number, say
k∗.
It remains to compute the expected profits of the informed trader and the
noise traders: Starting with the insider, from (2.2) and the above analysis of
the insider’s profits it follows that
piI(v) = E{v˜ − p˜)x˜|v˜ = v} =
E{(v − p0 − λy˜)( 1
2λ
[v − p0 − λρσz
σv
(v − p0)])|v˜ = v}.
Since E(y˜|v˜ = v) = E{β(v˜ − p0) + z˜|v˜ = v} = (v − p0)(β + ρσzσv ), this gives
piI(v) = (v − p0)2
(
1− λβ − λρσz
σv
)( 1
2λ
(1− λρσz
σv
)
)
.
By (2.2) 1−λβ−λρσz
σv
= λβ and 1−λρσz
σv
= 2λβ. Taking expectations with
respect to v˜, the insider’s expected profits can be written
E(p˜iI) = σ
2
vλβ
2
as claimed. The noise traders’ expected profits are
E(v˜ − p˜)z˜) = E{((v˜ − p0)− λ(β(v˜ − p0) + z˜))z˜} = (1− λβ)ρσvσz − λσ2z ,
and this can be written as claimed by using that (1−λβ) = 1
2
+ ρ
2
λσz
σv
, which
follows from the first part of (2.2).
Since we here have a pure exchange economy, it must be the case that
these profits sum to zero, which they do. This completes the proof of the
theorem. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
10
2.1 Some Properties of the equilibrium
The first observation we make is that when ρ = 0 and k = 0, then β = σz/σv
and λ = σv/2σz which are the same expressions as given by Kyle (1985).
When this is the case, our model is the same as the standard one. When
k = 0 but ρ is an arbitrary correlation coefficient, the cubic equation (2.3)
becomes quadratic in β with solution
β =
1
2
σz
σv
(√
4− 3ρ2 − ρ
)
and λ =
σv
σz
√
4− 3ρ2 ,
which are the same results as in Aase et. al. (2012), in which case the model
has partly informed noise traders and fair price setting.
Figure 1 illustrates the parameter β(k, ρ) as a function of k and ρ, while
Figure 2 presents the projection of the resulting surface onto the (β, k)-plane
when ρ = .5, and Figure 3 illustrates the projection onto the (β, ρ)-plane
when k = .5.
−0
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− 0.6
− 0.4
− 0.2
0.1
k axis
rho axis 0
0.2
ta axis0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.3
0.4
Fig. 1: The surface β(k, ρ) as a function of k and ρ (σv = 1.0, σz = .4).
The parameter β can be negative for values of k larger than some k0 when
ρ is strictly positive, and β can be negative for values of ρ larger than some
ρ0 when k is strictly positive (Figure 3), both for the same values of σz and
σv as above. In the remaining figures in this section we use the parameter
values σv = 1.0, and σz = .4. For negative values of ρ is β non-negative as
a function of k, and for k = 0 is β non-negative as a function of ρ. These
features can also be seen from Fig. 1.
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Fig. 2: The parameter β(k, ρ) as a function of k when ρ = .5.
Fig. 3: The parameter β(k, ρ) as a function of ρ when k = .5.
When the true value v > p0 the insider would normally buy a positive
quantum x = β(v − p0), but when β < 0 he then goes short. This only
happens when k and ρ are both positive and large enough, and is not very
realistic. A short discussion in nevertheless in order: In Figure 2 where ρ = .5
this happens when k ≥ 3.8. In Figure 3 this occurs for k = .5 when ρ ≥ .9.
In this situation the market maker gets a high quality signal from the noise
traders, and adjust the value accordingly. By adding a fee on top of that the
stock becomes very expensive on average. The insider, acting strategically,
may then obtain a positive profit (v − p)x by going short, and thus reduces
the profit of the market maker. Short-selling by the informed trader will
move the price towards the correct value. Similar reasoning is valid when
v < p0.
A main finding in this paper is that the market maker may very well
make a profit larger than that of the insider, by setting prices as assumed in
relationship (2.1). Figure 4 illustrates this.
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Fig. 4: The three profits as function of k, when ρ = .5.
It shows the three profits as functions of k. The positive, decreasing curve
is the insider’s profit, the increasing curve is the market maker’s. For k > .2,
the market maker’s profit is the largest. Thus, by modifying the price by
a fairly modest amount2, the uninformed market maker is able to obtain a
strictly positive profit, which exceeds the well informed insider’s profits.
To indicate the effect of the correlation coefficient ρ on the various profits,
consider the profits as functions of ρ for a given k. Figure 5 illustrates this
relationship for k = .5.
Fig. 5: The three profits as function of ρ, when k = .5.
Unlike the situation of a fiduciary market maker when k = 0, the noise
traders do not achieve zero profits for ρ = 1. The fee charged by the market
maker is a transfer from noise traders (and insider) to the market maker.
The market maker’s profit exceeds that of the insider for all values of ρ > .1.
When the noise traders are mislead, both the other parties make positive
profits, the insider the most. This is because the informed trader hides behind
2Since k enters as a multiple of y˜, the effect on the price is not readily apparent. We
will return to this issue below.
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the noise traders. When the value is high, the noise traders tend to sell, and
the informed trader will buy. The order stream is low and market makers
earn a small profit. In the limit, when ρ = −1, the informed trader reads
the behavior of the noise traders perfectly and takes the opposite position,
eliminating market makers.
In the situation illustrated σv/σz = 2.5 > 1, in which case one would
believe that the informed parties have an advantage, in particular the insider,
since he has very precise information about the true value, which is rather
uncertain to the market maker. For example, when σv = σz = 1, the market
maker has the highest profit already from ρ > −.4 for k = .5 (Figure 5), and
in Figure 4 the corresponding crossing point of the two profit curves occurs
already at k = .08 for ρ = .5 (compared to k = .17 in Figure 4).
Figure 5 illustrates that when the noise traders have information, this
limits the profit of the market maker as ρ increases, for any given value of
k. However, Figure 4 indicates that this profit increases without bounds as
a function of k, for any given value of ρ. Therefore, in the next sections
we explore the simpler situation where ρ = 0, i.e., the noise traders are
uninformed.
2.2 Non-fiduciary market makers, uninformed noise
traders.
When noise trader demand is not correlated with the true value (ρ = 0), we
have the following corollary to Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. When ρ = 0 there exists an equilibrium in which x and p are
linear functions. Defining
(2.4) β =
1
2λ
and λ =
βσ2v
β2σ2v + σ
2
z
+ k∗
where k∗ is the value of k determined by the regulatory constraint, the equi-
librium is given by
x(v˜) = β(v˜ − p0), p(x˜+ z˜) = p0 + λ(x˜+ z˜).
The parameter β is a solution to the cubic equation
(2.5) 2k∗σ2vβ
3 + σ2vβ
2 + 2k∗σ2zβ − σ2z = 0,
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which also determines the constant λ. The expected profits are as follows:
The insider: E(p˜iI) = σ
2
vλβ
2 = 1
2
σ2vβ.
The market maker: E(p˜iM) = λσ
2
z − 12σ2vβ = k(β(k)2σ2v + σ2z).
The noise traders: E(p˜iN) = −λσ2z .
The last expression for the profit of the market maker is derived below.
It says that this profit has a lower bound kσ2z , attained when the insider does
not trade (β = 0).
Denoting the trading intensity β := β(k, σv, σz), it is well known from
Kyle (1985) that β(0, σv, σz) =
σz
σv
. It is also easy to see that β(k, σv, σz) ≤ σzσv
for k ≥ 0. When k →∞ the equation approaches β(β2 − σ2z/σ2v) = 0 which
has the roots β1 = 0, β2 = σz/σv and β3 = −σz/σv, of which only the first
makes sense. Kyle’s solution cannot be valid here, since all trade will stop
with this large price distortion. If the insider buys, he will on average be
charged a very high price and suffers a loss. If he sells he will on average
receive a very low price. With such a large ”bid-ask spread”, the market
closes down.
It can be seen that β = 0 cannot solve (2.5) for finite k. Hence, for k > 0,
0 < β ≤ σz
σv
. Why does the insider always trade regardless of k? The reason
is that if he does not trade, he will loose since the expected return to trading
is always strictly positive. However, his trading intensity decreases with k;
implicit differentiation of (2.5) gives that
dβ(k)
dk
≤ 0, for all k ≥ 0.
A graph of β(k) is shown in Figure 7 when σv = σz = 1.
Fig. 7: The intensity β(k) as a function of k (σv = σz = 1).
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The price sensitivity parameter λ(k) = 1/(2β(k)) thus increases with k,
and the market depth 1/λ(k) decreases with k. This latter quantity mea-
sures the trade, i.e., order flow, necessary to change the price by one unit of
account. Figure 8 shows a graph of the parameter λ as a function of k, of
interest for later comparisons.
Fig. 8: The parameter λ(k) as a function of k (σv = σz = 1).
To obtain further insight into market maker behavior, notice from (2.4)
that the price sensitivity parameter contains two terms:
λ(k) =
β(k)σ2v
β2(k)σ2v + σ
2
z
+ k.
The first term on the right hand side is the indirect effect on this parameter
of a price perturbation. This term is decreasing in k. Ignoring k for the
moment, interpreting the term
λ˜ =
βσ2v
β2σ2v + σ
2
z
as a function of β, the function λ˜ := λ˜(β) has maximum for β = β∗, where
β∗ =
σz
σv
,
which interestingly is the optimal solution in the Kyle model. In this model
β is a function of the σ’s and will not vary independent of these.
The intuition is as follows. Outside equilibrium, if β is very high, informed
traders overtrade and market makers must adjust prices downwards. On the
other hand, if β is below β∗, market makers do not adjust prices upwards.
Rather the un-informativeness of the order flow in this case makes the market
makers reduce their responsiveness to orders.
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When k > 0 is introduced, β varies with k given the σ’s. Indeed β
is smaller, and so is the term β(k)σ
2
v
β2(k)σ2v+σ
2
z
, which is why this term is always
smaller than σv
2σz
in our model, the value of λ in the Kyle model. In other
words, the function λ˜(β) is increasing in β for β < σz
σv
.
Intuitively, increasing k has a positive direct effect on the price sensitivity.
However, there is an indirect, negative effect on price sensitivity as well. As
high k makes informed traders trade more softly, the order flow has a smaller
effect on the indirect part of the conditional expected asset value.
Turning to the profits, for the insider the expected profit in Corollary 1
is
E(p˜iI) = E{E{(v˜ − p˜)x˜|v˜}} = 1
2
β(k)σ2v ,
which follows from Theorem 1 since λ(k)β(k) = 1/2 when ρ = 0. The
expected profit of the market makers can be computed as follows:
E(p˜iM) = E{E{(p˜− v˜)(x˜+ z˜)|y˜}.
This can written
E(p˜iM) = E{E{E(v˜ + ky˜|y˜)y˜ − v˜y˜}|y˜} =
E{E{E(v˜y˜|y˜) + E(ky˜2)− v˜y˜}|y˜} = k var(y˜) = k(β(k)2σ2v + σ2z),
which proves the latter formula for this profit given in Corollary 1. Using
Theorem 1, this quantity can also be written
E(p˜iM) =
1
2
( σ2z
β(k)
− β(k)σ2v
)
.
From this latter expression it is clear that E(p˜iM) increases with k (since β(k)
is a decreasing function of k). Also note that equating these two expressions
for the market maker’s profits, leads directly to the cubic equation of β in
(2.5).
Figure 9 shows these two profits as functions of the parameter k, when
σv = σz = 1. The increasing curve is the market maker’s profit.
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Fig. 9: The two profits as a function of k (σv = σz = 1).
For k ≥ .23 the market maker’s profit exceeds that of the insider. The
same situation was encountered in Figure 4, but then with ρ = .5. See also
Figure 5.
One can get a measure of the price distortion at this level of k by cal-
culating the standard deviation of the price with distortion in units of the
standard deviation of the price of a fiduciary market maker. We then consider
SD(p˜)(k) :=
√
var(p˜)(k) = λ(k)
√
β(k)2σ2v + σ
2
z .
Note, when there is no inside information, p˜ = p0 and SD(p˜) = 0. Thus
inside information increases the variance of p˜.
The relative price distortion is measured by
d(k) := SD(p˜)(k)/SD(p˜)(0).
A graph of d(k) is shown in Figure 10.
Fig. 10: The relative price distortion d(k) as a function of k.
At the point at which profits are equal d(.23) = 1.22, meaning that the
relative price distortion has resulted in a standard deviation which is 22 per
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cent larger than with fair pricing. At this level price distortions by market
makers can have a significant effect on price volatility.
If, for example, the regulatory authority sets a B corresponding to maxi-
mally 30 per cent increase in the volatility, this amounts to setting k∗ = .32.
In this case the market maker would have a profit about 1.4 times that of
the well informed insider.
As mentioned in Section 2 we could alternatively consider the condi-
tional expected price deviation λ(k)E(y˜|y˜ > 0), as measured in units of
λ(0)E(y˜|y˜ > 0) when k = 0. Using truncation of the normal variable it
follows that
E(y˜|y˜ > 0) = 2√
2pi
√
β(k)2σ2v + σ
2
z
Thus the conditional expected price deviation so defined can be written
(2.6) pd(k) :=
λ(k)E(y˜|y˜ > 0)
λ(0)E(y˜|y˜ > 0) =
λ(k)
√
β(k)2σ2v + σ
2
z
λ(0)
√
2σz
.
Interestingly, this measure is seen to be the same in this model as the one
we have applied above, i.e., d(k) = pd(k) for all k ≥ 0, which lends support
to our former choice.
Finally we consider the informativeness in prices when price is distorted.
A simple measure of informativeness of prices is defined by
ι := 1− var(v˜|p˜)
var(v˜)
.
When the price carries no private information about the true value of the
asset, the conditional variance equals the unconditional variance, and ι = 0.
When the price equals the value of the asset, the conditional variance equals
zero and ι = 1, in which case all private information is reflected in the price.
Thus 0 ≤ ι ≤ 1.
In order to compute this measure, recall that
var(p˜) = λ(k)2(β(k)2σ2v + σ
2
z),
cov(v˜, p˜) = λ(k)β(k)σ2v =
1
2
σ2v ,
ρv˜,p˜ =
1
2
σ2v
σv
√
var(p˜)
=
β(k)σv√
β(k)2σ2v + σ
2
z
,
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so that
var(v˜|p˜) = var(v˜)(1− ρ2v˜,p˜) = σ2v
(
1− β(k)
2σ2v
β(k)2σ2v + σ
2
z
)
.
From this it follows that
ι(k) =
β(k)2σ2v
β(k)2σ2v + σ
2
z
,
or, ι(k) = λ˜β(k). In Figure 11 we present a graph of the informativeness as
a function of k.
Fig. 11: Informativeness ι(k) as a function of k.
It shows that informativeness in prices decreases convexly as a function
of the distortion level k, as one would, perhaps, think. Distorting prices is
not informative to the other market participants.
As a summary of the model in Corollary 1, and for later comparisons,
in Table 1 we give the connection between k∗ , d(k∗), ι(k∗), as well at the
profits E(p˜iM) and E(p˜iI) for reasonable values of the price distortion d. As
can be seen, at a price distortion of 10 per cent, the market maker’s profit is
41.8 per cent of the perfectly informed insider. The informativeness (market
efficiency) at the corresponding levels of k∗ should be compared to ι(0) =
0.50.
The insider has the highest profits for the values of d < 1.25, and this
profit is decreasing with k∗. For d = 1.25 and above, the market maker’s
profit is the largest of the two.
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Model: Corollary 1
d(k∗) 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.10 1.25
k∗ .010 .020 .051 .103 .263
E(p˜iM) .020 .039 .093 .176 .387
E(p˜iI) .490 .481 .455 .420 .343
ι(k∗) .49 .48 .45 .41 .32
Table 1: The connection between k∗, d(k∗) and other quantities.
3 The market maker has privileged informa-
tion as well
In the model of this last section the situation is as in Section 2.2 concerning
the insider and the noise traders (ρ = 0), but now also the market maker
has privileged information. We want to explore what effect this has on the
equilibrium, when the market maker is not a fiduciary.
We think that this situation is not uncommon in the real world; that
market makers of a certain size and importance may be ’more than well
informed’. The Chinese walls may not be as soundproof as advertised!
Initially we assume that the market maker has private information. Later
this situation will be compared with the simpler case when the insider knows
the information the market maker actually possesses. The distribution of
profits will be of interest, as well as market efficiency and price distortion.
Our assumption is that the market maker, but not the insider, receives
an independent signal m˜ of the form
m˜ = v˜ + ˜
where ˜ ∼ N (0, σ2 ). Also E(˜ v˜) = E(˜ y˜) = 0. As in the rest of the paper,
joint normality is assumed.
The pricing mechanism is then
(3.1) p˜ = p(y˜, m˜) = E{v˜ + u˜|m˜, y˜},
where, as in Section 2, u˜ = ky˜ for a non-negative parameter k.
Since we are in a ’normal universe’, we know that the conditional expected
value is linear in m˜ and y˜, i.e., there exists two constants λ and µ such that
(3.2) p˜ = p(y˜, m˜) = p0 + λy˜ + µ(m˜− p0).
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Equilibrium is defined as before. We then have the following result:
Theorem 3.1. When the market maker has privileged information, there
exists an equilibrium in which x and p are linear functions. Defining
(3.3) β =
1
2λ
(1− µ), λ = k
∗σ2zσ
2
v + σ
2
 (βσ
2
v + k
∗β2σ2v + k
∗σ2z)
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
and
µ =
σ2vσ
2
z
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
.
where k∗ is the value of k determined by the regulatory constraint, the equi-
librium is given by
x(v˜) = β(v˜ − p0), p(y˜, m˜) = p0 + λy˜ + µ(m˜− p0).
The parameter β is a solution to the cubic equation
(3.4) 2k∗σ2vσ
2
β
3 + (σ2vσ
2
 )β
2 + 2k∗σ2z(σ
2
 + σ
2
v)β − σ2zσ2 = 0,
which also determines the constants λ and µ. The expected profits are as
follows:
The insider: E(p˜iI) = σ
2
vλβ
2.
The market maker: E(p˜iM) = λ(σ
2
z − σ2vβ2) = k(β2σ2v + σ2z).
The noise traders: E(p˜iN) = −λσ2z .
Proof: By the joint normality assumption between v˜ + u˜ and (y˜, m˜), the
price is a linear function of y˜ and m˜, or
p(y,m) = p0 + λy + µ(m− p0), (y = x+ z),
for some constants λ and µ, (E(y˜) = 0). The insider, realizing how the market
maker determines prices and that he has inside information, computes his
conditional expected profits, given his private information, as follows
piI(v) = E{[v˜ − p(y˜, m˜)]x|v˜ = v} = E{[v − p0 − λy˜ − µ(m˜− p0)]x|v˜ = v} =
E{[v − p0 − λ(x+ z˜)− µ(v + ˜− p0)]x|v˜ = v} =
(v − p0)x− λx2 − λxE{z˜|v˜ = v} − µ(v − p0)x− µxE{˜|v˜ = v} =
(v − p0)(1− µ)x− λx2.
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by the projection theorem. Profit maximization of this quadratic objective
requires that x solves
(v − p0)(1− µ)− 2λx = 0
or
x =
1
2λ
(v − p0)(1− µ) := β(v − p0),
so that the trading intensity β is given by
β =
1
2λ
(1− µ).
In other words, x(v) is linear in v, and given as claimed in the theorem.
We must determine the price sensitivity parameters λ and µ, and are
then led to study the properties of the random vector (v˜ + ky˜, y˜, m˜) which
is jointly normal with mean vector (p0, 0, p0) and covariance matrix M given
by
M =
(1 + kβ)2σ2v + k2σ2z , βσ2v(1 + kβ) + kσ2z , σ2v(1 + kβ)βσ2v(1 + kβ) + kσ2z , β2σ2v + σ2z , βσ2v
σ2v(1 + kβ), βσ
2
v , σ
2
v + σ
2


This is shown as follows: First var(y˜) = β2σ2v + σ
2
z since v˜ and z˜ are uncor-
related (independent). It follows that
var(v˜ + ky˜) = var
(
v˜ + k(β(v˜ − p0) + z˜)
)
=
σ2v + k
2(β2σ2v + σ
2
z) + 2kβσ
2
v = (1 + kβ)
2σ2v + k
2σ2z ,
which accounts for the first two terms on the diagonal of the matrix M. The
last term on the diagonal is var(m˜) = var(v˜ + ˜) = σ2v + σ
2
 . Next
cov(v˜ + ky˜, y˜) = cov(v˜, β(v˜ − p0) + z˜) + k var(y˜) =
βσ2v + k(β
2σ2v + σ
2
z) = βσ
2
v(1 + kβ) + kσ
2
z ,
which accounts for the first covariance in M. The next covariance is
cov(v˜ + ky˜, m˜) = cov(v˜, m˜) + k cov(y˜, m˜) =
cov(v˜, v˜ + ˜) + k cov(β(v˜ − p0) + z˜, v˜ + ˜) = σ2v(1 + kβ).
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The last covariance is cov(y˜, m˜) = βσ2v , which completes the determination
of the matrix M.
We now partition the matrix M into four parts as follows: Let M11 :=
(1 + kβ)2σ2v + k
2σ2z (a scalar), define the vector
M12 := (βσ
2
v(1 + kβ) + kσ
2
z , σ
2
v(1 + kβ))
and finally the matrix
M22 :=
(
β2σ2v + σ
2
z , βσ
2
v
βσ2v , σ
2
v + σ
2

)
.
It follows from results in multivariable normal analysis3 that
E{v˜ + ky˜|y˜ = y, m˜ = m} = p0 +M12M−122
(
y
m− p0
)
.
Also
var(v˜ + ky˜|y˜ = y, m˜ = m) = M11 −M12M−122M21,
where M21 is the transpose of M12 (T. W. Anderson (1958, Theorem 2.5.1,
p29). It remains to compute these quantities: The inverse of the matrix M22
is given by
M−122 =
1
det(M22)
(
σ2v + σ
2
 , −βσ2v
−βσ2v , β2σ2v + σ2z
)
,
where the determinant of M22 is
det(M22) = β
2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 ).
The conditional expectation in question is computed in two steps: (i) First
we find the vector
M12M
−1
22 =
((βσ2v(1 + kβ) + kσ2z)(σ2v + σ2 )− σ4v(1 + kβ)
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
,
−(βσ2v(1 + kβ) + kσ2z)βσ2v + σ2v(1 + kβ)(β2σ2v + σ2z)
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
)
.
3In several period models one has to use filtering theory, which at this point is not
sufficiently developed to cope with the generality of this situation.
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(ii) Finally we compute the scalar product
M12M
−1
22
(
y
m− p0
)
=
kσ2zσ
2
v + σ
2
 (βσ
2
v(1 + kβ) + kσ
2
z)
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
y+
σ2vσ
2
z
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
(m− p0).
This shows that
p(y,m) = p0 + λ y + µ (m− p0)
where
λ =
kσ2zσ
2
v + σ
2
 (βσ
2
v(1 + kβ) + kσ
2
z)
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
and
µ =
σ2vσ
2
z
β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
as claimed.
From the above connection between β, λ and µ, 2βλ = (1 − µ), we can
now derive the cubic equation for β, and the result is as given in Theorem 3.1.
The monotonicity property in k of the various parameters can be verified,
much as in Section 2.2, i.e., β(k) is non-increasing in k, λ(k) and µ(k) are
both non-decreasing in k.
It remains to compute the two profit functions: The insider’s expected
profits are
E(p˜iI) = E{(v˜− p˜)x˜} = E{β(v˜− p0)2−λy˜β(v˜− p0)−µ(m˜− p0)β(v˜− p0)} =
βσ2v − λβ2σ2v − µβσ2v = σ2vβ(1− λβ − µ) = λβ2σ2v ,
since 2λβ = (1− µ).
The expected profits of the market maker is
E(p˜iM) = E((p˜− v˜)y˜) = E{(p0 + λy˜ + µ(m˜− p0))y˜} − E{v˜y˜} =
p0E(y˜) + λE(y˜
2) + µE{(m˜− p0)y˜} − E{v˜(β(v˜ − p0) + z˜)} =
λ(β2σ2v + σ
2
z) + βσ
2
v(µ− 1) = λ(σ2z − β2σ2v)
where we have used that (µ− 1) = −2βλ. As in Section 2.2 this can also be
computed as
E(p˜iM) = E{E{E(v˜ + ky˜|y˜)y˜ − v˜y˜}|y˜} =
E{E{E(v˜y˜|y˜) + E(ky˜2)− v˜y˜}|y˜} = k var(y˜) = k(β(k)2σ2v + σ2z).
By equating these two expressions for the profit, the cubic equation for β
again results. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
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3.1 Some comments to the theorem
It can be seen that when σ → ∞ the above results converge to the corre-
sponding ones of Section 2, in particular µ → 0. In this case the market
maker has no privileged information.
When σ → 0, on the other hand, it follows that β → 0 so in the limit
the insider does not trade. He understands how the market maker sets prices
equal to the expected true value plus fee, that the market maker has inside
information, and how much. In this case λ = k∗, µ = 1 and p(y˜, m˜) = k∗y˜+v˜.
The market maker’s expected profit is then E(piM) = k
∗σ2z which is also the
expected loss of the noise traders, while the insider has zero profits. The
more noise trading, the higher the profit of the well informed market maker.
These are polar cases.
When k∗ = 0, then β = σz
σv
, the Kyle solution. We then have the following
corollary:
Corollary 2. When k = 0 and the market maker has private information,
there exists an equilibrium in which x and p are linear functions. Defining
(3.5) β =
1
2λ
(1− µ), λ = σvσ
2

2σzσ2 + σzσ
2
v
and
µ =
σ2v
2σ2 + σ
2
v
.
the equilibrium is given by
x(v˜) = β(v˜ − p0), p(y˜, m˜) = p0 + λy˜ + µ(m˜− p0).
The parameter β is a solution to a quadratic equation, and given by
(3.6) β =
σz
σv
.
The expected profits are as follows:
The insider: E(p˜iI) = σ
2
vλβ
2.
The market maker: E(p˜iM) = 0.
The noise traders: E(p˜iN) = −λσ2z .
Note that λ is proportional to (1 − µ) since β is constant. The better
informed the market maker is (larger µ), the smaller price adjustments will
be made for given orders. Noise trader losses decrease in µ.
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We notice that λ → 0 and µ → 1 as σ → 0, in which case the price
becomes the true value of the asset in the limit. The insider still trades,
but obtains zero profits, and the noise traders do not loose. (When k =
0 the market maker makes no profit.) In the next section we explore an
intermediate situation where µ ∈ (0, 1) and k > 0, that can otherwise be
compared to the analysis in Section 2.2.
Notice that the market maker does not act strategically with respect to
his private information. Instead he lets the market alone benefit from this
signal, improving efficiency. As it turns out, this benevolent act may still be
to his advantage, as we shall see below.
3.2 Properties of the equilibrium with a privately in-
formed market maker
In order to compare with the equilibrium of Section 2, we consider the fol-
lowing set of parameters: σv = σz = 1, σ = .1. Here the market maker is
fairly well informed, since σ is relatively small compared to σv.
A graph of β(k) as a function of the parameter k is shown in Figure 12
for the parameter values indicated above.
Fig. 12: The trading intensity β(k) as a function of k.
In the same figure we also show the corresponding trading intensity for
the model of Corollary 1 ( Figure 7). Compared to this, the values of β
are now smaller with the exception of k = 0, as we have just seen. As we
shall see below, the insider trades more softly when he does not know the
signal received by the market maker. Increasing the volatility σ, moderately
increases the values of β(k). Also note that β is always positive.
Next, we turn to the price sensitive parameter λ(k) as a function of k.
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In Figure 13 we provide a graph using the same parameter values as above,
where we also show the corresponding function in Figure 8 in Section 2.2 as
the upper curve.
Fig. 13: The price sensitivity parameter λ(k) as a function of k.
Comparing to Figure 8, the values of this parameter are smaller, which
is natural since the market maker has an additional component from which
to determine the price. In the relationship λ(k) = 1
2β(k)
(1− µ(k)), the factor
1
2β(k)
is larger than the one in Section 2.2, but it is multiplied by the term
(1 − µ(k)) which is smaller than 1, here more than compensating for the
increase in the first factor. Increasing the volatility σ increases the values of
λ(k). As we know from Corollary 2, λ is not 0 when k = 0 (but close to 0
here as σ is small).
The new quantity of interest, µ, influences the price due to the market
maker’s inside information. A graph of this parameter is shown in Figure 14,
where the volatilities are the same as above.
Fig. 14: The informed price sensitivity parameter µ(k) as a function of k.
As can be seen from this figure, most of the value in µ(k) is attributed
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to µ(0) = .98. The subsequent increase of .01 takes place for small values
of k. For k larger than about .02, this variable does not increase much; the
parameter µ has to do with the market maker’s private information, and
only depends indirectly on k via β(k). This information the market maker
possesses independent of the values of k. Increasing the volatility σ decreases
this function in the leftmost end.
Our next issue is the profit of the market maker, shown in Figure 15 for
the same values of the parameters as above.
Fig. 15: The market maker’s profits as as a function of k.
Comparing to Figure 9 in Section 2.2, also presented in the above figure
as the upper curve, this profit is seen to be lower than the profit when the
market maker has no inside information. When k > 0, the insider trades
less for any given k, and the market maker takes in less in fees. It is, per-
haps, surprising that the market maker do not use the private information to
his/her advantage when it comes to profits. The reason is that he does not
act strategically by assumption. Rather he lets the information be reflected
in the price.
The market maker’s information influences profits for a given k. However,
this is only part of the story. The relative price distortion is a function of
the information the market maker possesses as well as k. The market maker
may choose a higher k when he is more informed, increasing profits. After
comparing the profits of insiders and market makers, we shall address these
issues in more detail.
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Fig. 16: The two profits piM and piI as functions of k.
Figure 16 shows the profits of the insider and the market maker of the
present model, for the same parameter values as above, where the decreasing
curve is the profits of the insider. As can be seen, for a small value of k
onwards, here about 0.0035, the market maker’s profit exceeds that of the
insider. The reason is that the insider’s profit has decreased much more than
the market maker’s for any given value of k. As we shall see below, this
point corresponds to a relatively modest price change in terms of relative
volatility. The corresponding point in Figure 9 is .25 , or about 71 times
larger on the k-axis. The crossing point on the k-axis increases when the
volatility σ increases.
More fundamental to our analysis is the following, leading to Table 2 be-
low. The percentwise price distortion measured by the function d(k), defined
in Section 2, is illustrated next. For this we need the standard deviation
SD(p˜), which is the square root of the following expression
var(p˜) = var
(
p0 + λy˜ + µ(m˜− p0)
)
=
λ2var(y˜) + µ2var(m˜) + 2λµcov(y˜, m˜− p0) =
λ2(β2σ2v + σ
2
z) + µ
2(σ2v + σ
2
 ) + 2λµβσ
2
v .
From this we can compute the change in volatility relative to fair pricing
d(k) =
SD(p˜(k))
SD(p˜(0))
,
which is illustrated as the lower for the two curves in Figure 17a, while the
upper curve is the same as in Figure 10. The parameters are still the same.
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Fig. 17a: The relative price distortion d(k) as a function of k.
Suppose the regulator maximally accepts a price distortion of 1 per cent
(d = 1.01). The corresponding value of k is then k∗ = .110 in the present
model. In the model with uninformed market maker the corresponding value
of k is .010 (see Table 1). For a given d, the informed market maker makes
a much higher profit than the uninformed. The reason is simply that the
informed market maker may choose a higher level of k without attracting
the attention of the regulator. The fact that profits are lower for a given k,
is of less importance.
Fig. 17b: The relative price distortion d(k) for the present model.
From the expression for the relative price distortion we notice that it is
a rather complicated function of k, since it depends on β(k), µ(k), and λ(k)
and powers and products of these functions, which are themselves rather
complicated functions of k.
d(k) =
√
λ2(k)(β2(k)σ2v + σ
2
z) + µ
2(k)(σ2v + σ
2
 ) + 2λ(k)µ(k)β(k)σ
2
v
λ2(0)(β2(0)σ2v + σ
2
z) + µ
2(0)(σ2v + σ
2
 ) + 2λ(0)µ(0)β(0)σ
2
v
.
In Figure 17b we illustrate the peculiar shape of d for small values of k,
not apparent in Fig. 17a. This will be further illustrated in the next section.
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At the point where the profits cross in Figure 16, the relative price dis-
tortion is about .25 percent (a quarter of one percent). The corresponding
distortion in Section 2.2 was about 22 percent. If as above, the regulator
sets B corresponding to maximally 1 per cent relative price distortion, this
amounts to setting k∗ = .110, at which point the market maker has a profit
about 400 times that of the perfectly informed insider. This ratio is much
higher than in the model of Section 2.2.
When the volatility of ˜ increases tenfold to σ = 1.0, at the level of k
where the profit curves cross, the relative price distortion increases to around
10 per cent, still far lower than with uninformed market maker.
It is also of interest to study the standard deviation of the price p˜. In
Figure 18 we demonstrate this for the two models under consideration, the
highest curve corresponds to the standard deviation SD(p˜)(k) of the present
model.
Fig. 18: The standard deviation of the price p˜(k).
As we see, the price in the present model is more volatile than the price in
the model where the market maker is uninformed. Comparing to the model
of Corollary 1, this demonstrates how the volatility of prices increases with
the information reflected in the price.
Finally we explore the informativeness in prices. For this we need to
compute the variance of p˜ and the conditional variance of y˜ given the price
p˜. The variance var(p˜) was derived just above. The covariance between v˜
and p˜ is
cov(v˜, p˜) = cov
(
v˜, p0 + λy˜ + µ(m˜− p0)
)
=
cov
(
v˜, λ(β(v˜ − p0) + z˜
)
+ cov
(
v˜, µ(v˜ + ˜− p0)
)
=
λβσ2v + µσ
2
v = σ
2
v(λβ + µ).
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The correlation coefficient between v˜ and p˜ is
ρv˜,p˜ =
cov(v˜, p˜)
σv
√
var(p˜)
=
(
σ2v(λβ + µ)
)
σv
√(
λ2(β2σ2v + σ
2
z) + µ
2(σ2v + σ
2
 ) + 2λµβσ
2
v
)
and the quantity var(v˜|p˜) = σ2v(1− ρ2v˜,p˜) becomes
var(v˜|p˜) = σ2v
(
1−
(
σ2v(λβ + µ)
)2
σ2v
(
λ2(β2σ2v + σ
2
z) + µ
2(σ2v + σ
2
 ) + 2λµβσ
2
v
)).
From the formula for the informativeness ι in Section 2.2 we get
ι =
σ2v(λβ + µ)
2
λ2(β2σ2v + σ
2
z) + µ
2(σ2v + σ
2
 ) + 2λµβσ
2
v
.
When µ = 0 this expression for ι is seen to reduce to the corresponding one
in Section 2.2.
A graph of ι(k) as a function of k is presented in Figure 19, where we
also present informativeness in Corollary 1. The volatilities are as above.
- Fig. 19: Informativeness ι(k) as a function of k.
Comparing to Figure 11, the informativeness has increased, and has an-
other shape as it starts out concave, and then becomes more convex at higher
values of k. With fair pricing (k = 0), prices with informed market maker
are almost perfectly informative, and close to twice as informative as without
this information. This difference will naturally diminish as the volatility σ
increases. The improved market efficiency reflects the fact that the market
maker acts as a fiduciary with respect to his own private information. The
insider, on the other hand, trades more softly so as to withhold information
from the market.
33
We conclude that the model with an informed market maker, who treats
his privileged information as laid out in Theorem 3.1, has several distin-
guishing features from the situation described in Section 2.2: (i) even if the
profit function piM(k) has decreased, the market maker obtains a significantly
higher profit for any given value of the maximal price disturbance allowed by
the regulator; (ii) the perfectly informed insider obtains a significantly lower
profit; (iii) the market becomes more efficient, in the sense of the price being
more informative; (iv) the level of price distortion parameter k at which the
market maker outperforms the insider is considerably lower.
The market maker can accordingly utilize his private information in an ef-
ficient manner, and still obtain a higher profit than without this information.
This is illustrated below.
As a summary of the model in Theorem 3.1, in Table 2 we give the
relationship between k∗ , d(k∗), ι(k∗), as well at the profits E(p˜iM) and E(p˜iI)
for the same values of the price distortion d as in Table 1. As can be seen, the
profits of the market maker have increased, while the profits of the insider
have decreased compared to Table 1.
A trading fee related to the order flow reduces market efficiency since the
order flow is weakly correlated with the value of the asset. If the regulator
demands a certain level of efficiency, she is more inclined to accept a fee when
markets are very efficient to begin with i.e. when market makers are well
informed. Thus whether regulators focus on price distortion or efficiency, the
argument is the same. Informed market makers may get away with charging
higher fees to traders.
At a price distortion of 1 per cent, the market maker’s profit has increased
5.5 times from the model in Corollary 1, while the insider’s profit has de-
creased from .490 to .0002, which is dramatic. The informativeness (market
efficiency) has increased at the corresponding levels of k∗.
Model: Theorem 3.1
d(k∗) 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.10
k∗ .110 .179 .306 .448
E(p˜iM) .1102 .1791 .3060 .4480
E(p˜iI) .0002 .0001 .0001 .0001
ι(k∗) .98 .96 .90 .82
Table 2: The relationship between k∗, d(k∗) and other quantities.
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Compared to Table 1, higher values of k∗ now correspond to the various
price distortions. This difference is so substantial, that even if the profit
function of the market maker is now lower as a function of k, the end result
is significantly higher profits for him, and corresponding lower profits for the
insider.
3.3 The insider knows the market maker’s signal as
well
There are two reasons why the insider obtains a smaller profit in the model
of the last section (for a given k). One is that the market maker has more
information than before, the other is that this information is private. In
order to separate these two effects and see which one is the most important,
we imagine that the insider also observes the signal m˜. This situation can be
seen to reduce to the model analyzed in Section 2, with the difference that
var(v˜) is replaced by var(v˜|m˜). Since m˜ = v˜ + ˜ where E(v˜˜) = 0, it follows
by joint normality that
var(v˜|m˜) = σ2v(1− ρ2m,v), and σ2m = σ2v + σ2
where
ρm,v =
cov(v˜, m˜)
σvσm
Accordingly
var(v˜|m˜) = σ
2
vσ
2

σ2v + σ
2

.
We notice that when σ → ∞ then var(v˜|m˜) → σ2v , the situation in Section
2, since the information content in the signal m˜ gets more and more blurred
as the volatility of ˜ increases.
By examining the model in Section 2, the situation where both the insider
and the market maker observes m˜ (and the insider observes v˜ as before) can
be analyzed by replacing σ2v by
σ2vσ
2

σ2v+σ
2

in the expressions for the insider’s trad-
ing intensity β, and in the corresponding expression for the price sensitivity
parameter λ. Clearly this amounts to reducing the variance relative to the
model of Section 2, since σ2v > σ
2
v · σ
2

σ2v+σ
2

. We then have the following
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Corollary 3. When the signal m˜ is public, there exists an equilibrium in
which x and p are linear functions. Defining
(3.7) β =
1
2λ
and λ =
βσ2vσ
2

β2σ2vσ
2
 + σ
2
z(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )
+ k∗
where k∗ is the value of k determined by the regulatory constraint, the equi-
librium is given by
x(v˜) = β(v˜ − p0), p(x˜+ z˜) = p0 + 1
2
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2

(m˜− p0) + 1
2
(v˜ − p0) + λz˜.
The parameter β is a solution to the cubic equation
(3.8) 2k∗
σ2vσ
2

σ2v + σ
2

β3 +
σ2vσ
2

σ2v + σ
2

β2 + 2k∗σ2zβ − σ2z = 0,
which also determines the constant λ. The expected profits are as follows:
The insider: E(p˜iI) =
σ2vσ
2

σ2v+σ
2

λβ2 = 1
2
σ2vσ
2

σ2v+σ
2

β.
The market maker: E(p˜iM) = λσ
2
z − 12 σ
2
vσ
2

σ2v+σ
2

β = k(β(k)2 σ
2
vσ
2

σ2v+σ
2

+ σ2z).
The noise traders: E(p˜iN) = −λσ2z .
Proof: The formula for the updating of the price can be deduced as follows:
By the projection theorem we get
E(v˜|m˜) = p0 + ρv,mσv(m˜− p0)/
√
σ2v + σ
2
 .
Since cov(m˜, v˜) = σ2v , it follows that
ρv,m =
σv√
σ2v + σ
2

which means that
E(v˜|m˜) = p0 + σ
2
v
σ2v + σ
2

(m˜− p0).
Accordingly, the updated price p˜ can be written
p˜ = p0 +
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2

(m˜− p0) + λ
[
β
(
v˜ − p0 − σ
2
v
σ2v + σ
2

(m˜− p0)
)
+ z˜
]
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= p0(1− λβ) + σ
2
v
σ2v + σ
2

(m˜− p0)(1− λβ) + λβv˜ + λz˜.
Recalling that λβ = 1
2
, this gives
(3.9) p˜ = p0 +
1
2
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2

(m˜− p0) + 1
2
(v˜ − p0) + λz˜.
The rest of the corollary then follows. 
In Table 3 we show the insider’s profit in the various models of the paper
when k = 0. Corollary 1 then refers to the Kyle solution, Corollary 2 to the
situation where the market maker has private information, and Corollary
3 to the situation where this information is also known to the insider, the
situation discussed in the present section. The parameter values are σv =
σz = 1, σ = 0.1. As can be seen, for these parameter values the change
Model: Corollary 1 Corollary 3 Corollary 2
E(p˜iI) 0.50 0.05 0.01
Table 3: E(p˜iI) in the various models when k = 0;
in the insider’s profit is largest when we move from the situation where the
market maker does not have any information, to the situation where he has
information which is also public. This leads to a reduction in the variance
of the price, and as a consequence the profit is reduced by a factor of 1/10.
When this information is also private, i.e., there is differential information
between these two parties, the insider’s profit is further reduced by a factor
of 1/5, a total reduction by a factor of 1/50.
The intuitive explanation is the following: Comparing the corollaries 1
and 3, the variance of profit per unit is reduced by a factor of 100 in the latter
model. On the other hand the trading intensity β increases by a factor of 10.
Knowledge of the market maker’s signal enables the insider to take advantage
of any mispricing much more confidently. The net effect is a tenfold reduction
in profits. Comparing the models in corollaries 1 and 2, we have seen that
the trading intensities are the same (β = 1). The insider, not knowing what
the market maker has observed, trades more softly. However in Corollary 2
β is multiplied by (1/2)σv(1− µ) = (1/2)(1/50) = 1/100.
In the same vein, Table 4 shows the profits of the insider and the market
maker when k = 0.03 for the same parameter values for the various models
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in Corollary 1, Corollary 3 and Theorem 3.1. For this relatively modest
value of k the market maker has a profit closer to that of the insider when
his information is also public. When the information is private, however, he
makes about 39 times as much as the insider, and the difference between these
two profits is largest to his advantage. Also, with no information the market
maker has the highest profit of these three scenarios, but then the insider
makes the most. The largest single effect of increased private information
thus seems to bring down the insider’s profit.
Model: Corollary 1 Corollary 3 Theorem 3.1 k
E(p˜iI) 0.472 0.033 0.0008 0.03
E(p˜iM) 0.057 0.043 0.031 0.03
d(k) 1.029 1.0015 1.0044 0.03
ι(k) 0.47 0.99 0.99 0.03
Table 4: The two profits in the various models when k = 0.03;
Note that in the model of Theorem 3.1 there is a lower limit on the profit
of the market maker equal to k times σ2z which is attained when the insider
stops trading. From Table 4 we can see that this lower bound is almost
reached for the parameter values considered.
Table 4 may indicate that the market maker is worse off in terms of profit
the more information he has. Apparently he would prefer to be uninformed,
and if he happens to be informed he may benefit from sharing this information
with the rest of the market. By assumption the market maker does not take
advantage of his information. The market maker profits from trading fees.
Ceteris paribus he makes more money, the more insiders trade (noise traders
trade exogenously). Thus for a fixed k he prefers to be uninformed, and if
informed he is better off sharing his information with the insider.
However, this conclusion is somewhat premature, since we consider profits
for a fixed value of k. Again we must consider k a parameter indirectly
determined by the regulator. To illustrate, suppose the regulator sets the
limit to 1 per cent price distortion. Table 4 shows that the models in Theorem
3.1 and Corollary 3 both pass the test, but not the model in Corollary 1.
When the market maker has private information, he can increase profits by
increasing k to .11 in which case piM(.11) = .110 in Theorem 3.1. When this
information is also public, he can increase to k = .12 in Corollary 3 in which
case piM(.12) = 0.13. In this situation the market maker obtains the highest
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profits when his information is public as in Corollary 3. The profit of the
insider reduces to .00022 when information is private, and to 0.017 when the
information is public. When information is private to the market maker, the
market maker and, in particular, the insider suffer the most.
This illustrates that when price distortions are taken into account, the
information is valuable for the market maker. He will profit from sharing his
private information with the insider. The same conclusion follows a fortiori as
the parameter σ increases, i.e., as the market maker’s information becomes
less precise.
The effects of other values of k in Corollary 3 can be read out in more
detail from the following figures. In each figure to follow, privately informed
(Th. 3.1) is compared to publicly informed market maker (Cor. 3).
Fig. 20: β(k) as a function of k.
In Figure 20 we present the trading intensity of the insider, and in the
same graph also the corresponding trading intensity in Theorem 3.1. As
already noted, for k = 0 β is 10 times higher when the market maker’s
information is public. This difference persists for positive values of k. The
trading intensity in the model of Corollary 3 is also significantly higher than
the corresponding intensity when the market maker is uninformed (see Fig.
7).
Figure 21 demonstrates the price sensitivity parameter λ(k) as a function
of k, in the same graph as the corresponding sensitivity of Theorem 3.1, the
latter is the lowest curve.
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Fig. 21: λ(k) as a function of k.
As can be seen, λ(k) is higher when the market maker has public infor-
mation. In Corollary 3 (as well as Corollary 1), λ(k) = 1/(2β(k)). Also
λTh3.1 = (1/(2βTh3.1))(1 − µ). So even if βCoroll 3 > βTh3.1, the price sen-
sitivity parameter µ explains this ”reversal” of the inequality. Again it is
the private information that accounts for the relatively low value of λTh3.1.
On the other hand λ with publicly informed market maker is lower than λ
with uninformed market maker. This follows directly from the relationship
between the corresponding β-parameters.
In Figure 22 we present a graph of the profit functions of the market
maker for the two models under consideration, the highest curve being the
one of the present model. As can be seen, they are fairly close but the latter
dominates uniformly in k. The difference is larger for moderately positive
values of k when insiders trade significant amounts. It first increases with
σ to a maximum, then falls. This is an important observation in explaining
the ranking of the profits between these two models.
Fig. 22: Profits of the market maker as a function of k.
In Figure 23 we also include the two profit functions of the insider, the
lowest falling curve corresponds to Theorem 3.1. The profit function of the
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insider is now larger, compared to the model of Theorem 3.1. This confirms
the results from tables 3 and 4.
Fig. 23: The four profit functions as functions of k.
The value of k where the profit functions of the insider and the market
maker are equal, is smallest when the market maker’s information is private,
and largest when the market maker has no information. This is due to the
increasing profit of the insider the less private information the market maker
possesses. Both pairs are seen to cross at a relatively low value of k (less than
.025) in Fig. 23, indicating that also in this situation the market maker will
quickly outperform the well informed insider as the parameter k increases.
When the information is private, this crossing point is as low as k = .0035.
Next we consider the price distortion d(k). In order to compute this
quantity in the present context, the market maker needs to update his price
conditional on the signal m˜, in other words p0 must be updated. The result
of this is given in Corollary 3. In order to calculate the price distortion, we
need the variance of p˜ given in (3.9). It is
var(p˜) =
3
4
σ4v
σ2v + σ
2

+
1
4
σ2v + λ
2σ2z .
Notice the role that the information of the market maker (and the insider)
plays: As this information becomes more precise (σ ↓ 0), the variance of the
security increases.
The relative price distortion is given by the formula
(3.10) d(k) =
√√√√ 34 σ4vσ2v+σ2 + 14σ2v + λ(k)2σ2z
3
4
σ4v
σ2v+σ
2

+ 1
4
σ2v + λ(0)
2σ2z
.
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A graph of d(k) is presented in Fig. 24 together with the corresponding
graph of Theorem 3.1.
Fig. 24: Price distortions d(k) as functions of k.
The price distortion is much lower than in the model where the market
maker’s has no information (recall Figure 17b), and also lower (uniformly in
k) than the corresponding graph of Theorem 3.1. When σ increases, the
difference increases to a maximum, and then decreases to zero.
This is an important observation. From Figure 22 we know that market
makers earn higher profits when information is public. If the regulator is
concerned with price distortion, Figure 24 implies that publicly informed
market makers may also increase k relative to privately informed market
makers and increase profits even more.
The standard deviation of the price is larger for small values of k for the
present model compared to Theorem 3.1, but this does not hold uniformly
in k, as demonstrated in Figure 25a. When σ increases, the relationship is
basically unchanged.
Prices reflect noise as well as asset value. There are two sources of noise:
noise trading and noise in the market maker’s information. An increase in
the variance of price may increase efficiency if the variance derives from vari-
ations in value. The opposite is the case if the increased variance is due to
the effects of pure noise trading. Noise trading is translated into price via λ.
Price reflects value via the informed market maker (µ) and via insider trad-
ing (λ and β). When the market maker is publicly informed, the information
channels are separable. The market maker uses Bayes law to update price.
Insiders influences price via trading. When the market maker has private
information, information channels are intertwined. Theorem 3 implies that
insider trading makes the market maker adjust prices less than Bayesian up-
dating would imply. The adjustment depends on insider trading intensity.
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This reduces the variance of the market price. On the other hand, when
the information of the market maker is public, the insider adjusts his/her
demand. Hence, the noise in the information has less influence on the price
reducing its variance. Comparing the variance across models thus depends
on how these opposing effects play out. In particular, when fees strangle in-
sider trading, the noise effect dominates making the price more volatile when
information is private.
Fig. 25a: The standard deviations of the price as functions of k.
When k grows large, the standard deviations converge, which is according
to intuition. This is demonstrated in Figure 25b.
Fig. 25b: The standard deviations of the price for larger values of k.
Finally we consider market efficiency. The informativeness in the present
model can be computed once we know
cov(v˜, p˜) =
1
2
σ2v
( σ2v
σ2v + σ
2

+ 1
)
,
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and
ρv,p =
1
2
σ2v
( σ2v
σ2v+σ
2

+ 1
)
σv
√
3
4
σ4v
σ2v+σ
2

+ 1
4
σ2v + λ(k)
2σ2z
.
From this we find the informativeness ι(k) = ρ2v,p(k) as follows
(3.11) ι(k) =
1
4
σ2v
( σ2v
σ2v+σ
2

+ 1
)2
3
4
σ4v
σ2v+σ
2

+ 1
4
σ2v + λ(k)
2σ2z
.
A graph of ι(k) is presented in Fig. 26.
Fig. 26: The informativeness ι(k) as a function of k.
The informativeness in prices is identical to the one of Theorem 3.1. This
is also the case when σ increases. Market efficiency does not suffer when
this information is shared with the insider.
As a summary of the model in Corollary 3, in Table 5 we present the
connection between k∗ , d(k∗), ι(k∗), as well at the profits E(p˜iM) and E(p˜iI)
for the same values of the price distortion d as in tables 1 and 2.
The informativeness (market efficiency) at the corresponding levels of k∗
is still seen to be high and at the level of Table 2 for the value of σ = .10
that we consider. The corresponding values of k∗ are higher than the ones in
Table 2 for Theorem 3.1. The discrepancy is not nearly as large as between
Table 1 and Table 2.
A major difference from Table 2 is that the profits of the insider have
increased substantially. The profits of the market maker have also increased
relative to the profits of Theorem 3.1. As pointed out above, this follows from
the ranking of the price distortions, demonstrated in Figure 24, together with
the ranking of the profits of the market maker, demonstrated in Figure 22.
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For a given value of the price distortion set by the regulator, we obtain a
higher value of k∗ for the model of the present section, which in its turn
leads to a higher profit due to the profit ranking noted above.
Also in this model the market maker outperforms the insider in terms of
profits. For a price distortion of 5 per cent the market maker now makes 3.3
per cent more than in the model of Theorem 3.1, while the insider makes 76
times as much.
Model: Corollary 3
d(k∗) 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.10
k∗ .120 .184 .309 .450
E(p˜iM) .1330 .1947 .3162 .4552
E(p˜iI) .0165 .0120 .0076 .0054
ι(k∗) .98 .96 .90 .82
Table 5: The connection between k∗, d(k∗) and other quantities.
It may seem surprising that the market maker is better off in terms of
profits by sharing his information with the insider. In both models the market
maker shares his private information with the market, but in the latter model
the insider is in addition informed about the precise content of the market
maker’s signal. This situation turns out to improve the profits for both the
informed parties, at the noise traders’ expense.
To see why this may be, assume that the market maker has received a
signal that happens to be far off the true value. If the insider sees this, he
may take a large position to exploit the mispricing. This will move the price
closer to the true value and increase the profits of market makers charging
higher fees.
In conclusion, when the market maker has private information, and sets
prices as explained, relatively low values of the price distortion d allows him
to obtain high profits by trading fees, higher than the perfectly informed
insider, since low values of d correspond to a high values of k∗. The difference
in profits is most dramatic when the market maker’s information is private,
but when this information is public both the informed parties make the most,
at the noise traders’ expense.
We have not studied what happens when the noise traders have partial
information in the above situation. From Figure 5 we know that the profits
of the two other parties are reduced, but which one is reduced the most may
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not be clear. However, using our model and the results in Theorem 2.1, the
reader may be able to check this out without any major difficulties.
4 Summary
The single auction model of Kyle (1985) is studied, allowing market makers
to maximize profit within regulatory limits by charging fees. This has several
implications for the equilibrium, the most important being that by perturbing
the price by a relatively modest amount, the market maker is able to obtain
a profit of the order of magnitude, and even higher than, a perfectly informed
insider. Noise traders may be uninformed, or partially informed.
We also analyze a situation where the market maker has private infor-
mation as well as being non-fiduciary. Compared to the model where the
market maker has no privileged information, we obtain several new insights.
As expected the well informed insider’s profit diminishes since his informa-
tional advantage has shrunk. This is because the market maker acts non-
strategically with respect to his private information, and allows this informa-
tion to be reflected into the price. Interestingly the informed market maker
may then increase his fees without being detected by the regulator, which in
turn increases his profits.
Our analysis indicates why speculative prices are more volatile than pre-
dicted by fundamentals. In particular, price volatility is shown to increase
with informed market maker. This is an important aspect of the effect of priv-
ileged information on security prices, which may explain the price/dividend
puzzle mentioned in the introduction.
Finally we analyze the situation where the market maker’s information is
public, which can be used to determine the value of differential information.
One major difference is that the insider’s profits is not nearly as low as when
the market maker’s information is private. In terms of market efficiency this
situation is similar to the one with private information. Price distortions
are now smaller, and profits larger as functions of the price perturbation
parameter k. As a result of this, perhaps surprisingly, the market maker’s
profit has now increased, i.e., it pays for him to share his private information
with the insider, but the noise traders are then even worse off.
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